

The Impact of Missile Defense Systems of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Implementation of the Regional Deterrence Strategy

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Abstract

Maximizing power in a regional anarchic environment has always been directly related to deterrence and regional security of countries. Strengthening and increasing power and how to use it has changed with the evolution of technology. Naturally, the defense and electoral strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the conditions of instability in the West Asian region, has undergone changes, transformations and is designed based on regional deterrence and as a control system has several models, goals, and rules that make it possible to operate. The defense-aggression equation and the balance of power in creating strategic stability is the main foundation of the functioning of such a system. Among these, defense-offensive tools play a major role in creating such stability that the missile defense systems of the Islamic Republic of Iran are one of the most important tools. The question that the present study seeks to answer is: What is the application of Iran's missile deterrence by harnessing power with power? To answer the question by using the documents and resources

of existing libraries and using descriptive methods and addressing concepts such as deterrence, the research findings show that the efficiency of Iran's missile system is not only in the shadow of production and growth of these weapons, but also change in type. The performance of missiles against the power of the hegemon and its ability to create deterrence, in other words, is a tactical change that has brought Iran to the point of balance of power and the focal point of power.

Keywords: Regional Deterrence, Missile Defense Systems, Regional Security

Introduction

Since the time when man succeeded to overcome the gravity power, the ground was paved for change of strategic equations and air supremacy and space control overshadowed such issues as geopolitics, and the power for the preservation of security and existence was expanded with regard to meaning. We can regard power as the central core of politics and the relations between the units in the international anarchic environment have always been the domain of competition, conflict, and struggle for acquisition, preservation, and promotion of power. This is why the missile defense system was noticed by the superpowers of East and West after WWII as one of the practical means of power as well

as a strong weapon. The United States of America was the first country that started its activity in this field in 1950 as the pioneer of the issue of missile defense shield. Because of the subject of the present study, the strategic policy of the US in the West Asia region regardless of the significant market of Mass Destruction Weapons is focused on the continuation of the traditional domination of the US in defending its interests and controlling the hostile countries in the region and regulation of power balance in the interest of its allies in the development of its interventionist goals. The US missile defense systems in the region are supposed to work as a power arm and bargaining chip for controlling countries that are not in line with US policies like Iran. But since "every action is followed by a reaction" the Islamic Republic of Iran has made several efforts to improve its missile capabilities to confront the hostile missile systems and reach a balance point. Numerous achievements in the field of missile technologies have made Iran the target of negative propaganda of intervening power as a "security challenge and regional threat" which directly targets Iran's national and regional security. Iran with its specific security concerns and though it is not a member of the missile technology control regime has been frequently investigated under the regulations of this regime. Iran is one of those countries that have adopted the deterrence strategy and promotion of military technology for dealing with the tangible threats posed by its enemies and it has succeeded so far to ensure and elevate its security in the West Asian chaotic region thanks to this doctrine (Aminian, Zamiri Jirsaraei, 2016: 61). The fundamental question which is addressed by the current research is as follows: what is the impact of the settlement of missile defense systems by the

intervening power in West Asia? The Islamic Republic of Iran in the regional domain including West Asia (Middle East) is faced with such systems, and then its influence on the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran is raised. The US missile defense systems are supposed to enhance its aggressive power through the neutralization of the attacks of the opposite party. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran has also adopted a similar strategy which is based on the neorealist theory of Waltz of the structural effects of the system and needs to strengthen and improve its missile defense power for neutralization of such imbalance. Therefore, it moves towards the upper stability point of the system. In short, missile defense systems have a double effect on regional security and are explained in the form of a deterrence system and the stability of its strategic effects. In the West Asia region, due to the strategic instability of missile systems of the intervening power in the region, we have been witness to more strategic instability that threatens the regional security of IRI. Thus, Iran's missile defense systems are among the strategic requirements in the defense policy of this country. The current study is descriptive and analytic and has been conducted using the library-based methods of data collection and has also been benefited from web-based sources. For the explication of the present study, the sources were reviewed and each one of them has approached the issue of strategic missile defense from a certain perspective but they have not addressed the issue of its consequences for the regional security in two states of regional stability and instability. Overall, some of the proposed analyses have declared Iran's missile defense policy a threat to the regional order and security. Accordingly, they have considered Iran to be a threat to security while they see the

modern weapons of the intervening power as a means for keeping the balance of regional security. On the other hand, some researchers have offered exactly the opposing views. However, the authors of the current essay have studied the issue of missile systems and their impact on the deterrence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, have the following goals: firstly, when missile defense systems strengthen the stability and are in the service of strategic stability; secondly, when these means cause strategic instability and finally lead to the weakening of deterrence and its fragility and puts the national security in danger.

Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations

The missile defense system is one of the complementary systems of deterrence. Particularly in two states of stability and instability, they have different functions in the domain of management of regional order. In other words, missile systems can be studied within the framework of the defense-attack equation included in the deterrence system. Generally speaking, the analytic and conceptual model of the current study can be presented as follows:




Figure 1- Analytic Model

In this model, the anarchic nature of the global system has been taken for granted. As a result of the function of influential factors, there are two security models in regional security systems; 1- individualistic security models; 2- collectivistic security models; and the individualistic security models include deterrence and power balance (Taheri, Sadeqi Yektaei, 2016: 54). For this reason, security systems are among the power balance and deterrence systems as two main systems of order and security. These systems are faced with stability and instability situations. Among the secondary complementary systems, one can refer to missile systems whose security-related consequences will be analyzed in the form of the creation of stability and instability in the aforementioned main systems. The deterrence system is one of the systems that countries consider themselves to be captivated inside it and always seek to break its bars. On the other hand, missile systems lie in the heart of deterrence, functionality, and unfunctionality. Regional orders due to the presence of intervening power are asymmetrical orders and a one-sided extensive deterrence will be also the manifestation of such an asymmetry. Thus, missile defense systems enhance the scale of asymmetry and pave the ground for more instability in the region and also cause more threats against regional security. Then, retaining a regional deterrence system particularly by the regional powers which are targeted by the intervening power requires two strategic actions to be taken, i.e. fortification of missile system as well as a missile defense system to reach the ideal of strategic balance. In this system, the countries are all after existence and for maximizing their security within a self-assisted system compete with other actors. This leads to the security dilemma. The

increase of governmental security is tantamount to the decrease of the security of the other (Adami, Keshavarz Moqadam, 2014: 234). Generally speaking, one can state that the security dilemma is the same for all governments regardless of different features of their internal structure and the best way for providing security is also the effort for increasing the national power. For this reason and due to the existence of security dilemma their function turns gradually the same for all of them, i.e. all governments seek to provide their security through maximizing power and ensuring their national interests. Waltz explains the functional uniformity of the inequal governments from the perspective of power based on the idea that the principle of order in the system, i.e. anarchy, brings about this similar function (Mohammadkhani, 2009: 93-94).

Theoretical Framework based on Waltz's Structural Realism Theory

In his renowned work entitled Theory of International Politics grounds the structural realism based on the theory of power balance (Sazmand et al, 2010: 255). According to this argument, the principle of order in the international system forces the governments to act based on their initial task, i.e. military power and self-assistance, regardless of their capacity. In fact, in the process of socialization the governments learn to sustain their security relying on the accumulated possibilities for declaring war against each other without paying any attention to each other (Mohammadkhani, 2009: 99; also cf. Abbasi Ashlaqi, 2004: 530). The latter author continues by mentioning the point that power can be useful when intelligent statesmen struggle to have a proper scale of it. However, in vital situations, the final concern of the

states is neither for the power rather it is for security (Waltz, 1988: 616). Lack of central sovereignty and anarchy encourage the governments to behave defensively and retain the power's balance (Qorbaninezhad et al. quoted from Waltz, 2014: 273). He notes that the principle of power balance is the factor that ensures stability in the international system (Qasemi, quoted from Waltz, 2010: 93). Then, balance is an automatic affair and the system is generally interested in balance (Qasemi, 2012: 176) .

Waltz refers to the effects of structure in the international system and notes that power balance is the main factor and mechanism of stability in the international anarchy system (Mohammadkhani, quoted from Waltz, 2009: 95). Anarchy causes the governments to maximize their power for existence and as a result guaranteeing internal security before foreign forces turn to the most important goal of the governments in the domain of foreign policy (Haji Yusefi, 2002: 1014). According to Waltz, the power balance is the common method that governs the formation of the international order (Rasuli Thani Abadi quoted from Waltz, 2009: 53). Waltz considers the neorealistic notion of power to be an efficient means through its unintelligent use by countries can imply risks (Waltz, 1988: 616). Waltz is also one of the key theoreticians of deterrence (Rasuli Thani Abadi, 2009: 53). As to the expansion of nuclear weapons, he refers to the latter issue and claims that the expansion of nuclear weapons among the world countries should not cause any concern because this will enhance their deterrence power before each other and decrease the possibility of war in the international system (Rasuli Thani Abadi, 2009: 53).

Deterrence

Deterrence has been defined as the prevention of action by someone in dread of a danger or a threat. Accordingly, one can argue that deterrence is more of a psychological effect on the enemy and dissuades him from planning an attack or a war (Rasuli Thani Abadi, 2009: 55). Deterrence strategy requires planning punishment that is either threatened to be implemented or used as a means to convince others that if they take any action they would pay a heavy price for their action. How governments are pushing their policies of deterrence forward consists of increasing the general military capabilities, the evolution of developed weapons having extensive destruction power, the establishment of unions, and threatening to retaliate. The threat that is posed for the sake of deterrence should be completely acceptable for the parties involved to be effective (Aqaei, Qaderi Kangavari, 2009: 64). According to the aforementioned theory, in the unstable conditions of the West Asia region, the chosen defense strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been designed around the idea of regional deterrence and as a control system, it has various models, goals, and rules that ensure their function. Meanwhile, the equation of defense-attack and power balance plays a key role in the creation of strategic stability in such a system. Here defense-aggression means to play the main role in the creation of such stability. Missile defense systems of the Islamic Republic of Iran are among the most important means used in this context. On the other hand, regional countries also take advantage of such systems for changing the strategic stability in their interest.

On the other hand, in the current international order countries require the expansion and strengthening of the deterrence policy beyond

their borders for sustaining their political entity and preservation of their sovereignty besides relying on land deterrence and denial of threats in their security environment. Then, the consequences of this type of deterrence will not be restricted to their land (Arghavani Pir Salami, Pirankhu, 2017: 55).

Success in reaching the capability of confronting the foreign threats particularly the capability of second blow enables Iran (Pur Akhundi, 2013: 184) to create regional deterrence relying on the space-based arms and appliances and by increasing the scope of its strategic depth. On the other hand, the United States of America is struggling to settle its missile systems in some strategic domains of this region. Then, its influence on the regional deterrence of the Islamic Republic of Iran is at stake.

Regional and trans-regional threats posed to Iran including continuous security challenge in the Middle East, the superiority of the military capability of the Zionist regime and the United States in the domain of air forces, its limitations in having access to developed technologies, and also the hostility of superpowers after the victory of Islamic Revolution. Since this country has adopted the common defensive deterrence strategy requires expanding its military and missile capability to increase its defense capability in the shortest time and the least cost and by strengthening its missile capabilities to make its deterrence beyond the borders more effective (Arghavani Pir Salami, Pirankhu, 2017: 55-56).

The application of the above theory in designing the research has been made around the concept of deterrence. The basis of a deterrence system is strategic stability. In other words, the defense-aggression equation has reached the zero point. To put it otherwise, a

power balance has been established. Then here we are faced with two issues: 1-invasion, 2-defense.

Before the invasion, we need to defend and in both cases, we need to use modern facilities and technologies to have access to the target (capability of first blow and second blow). It is important to note that the plan of sciences and technology instead of directly seeking to provide the balance in possible cases of investment to make itself engaged in more significant activities. Concentration on the chosen targets, not the balance which is the strategic slogan of modern sciences and technology (Salami, Tupchi, 2008: 110).

Upon the arrival of space-based MDW and missile systems after nuclear capability and prestige as a significant means of deterrence, it seems that the reach of strategic depth has been widened and this lack of access makes easy access to the target with missile systems. Here deterrence is faced with two issues as to the deterrence tools: 1- when 1- when they strengthen the strategic stability, 2- when they cause strategic instability. This issue has a direct relationship with disarmament. Given the aforementioned issues, disarmament is the two sides of the same coin. In other words, it can be both good and bad. It is good when the balance is reached and it will neutralize the danger of war. It is bad if one cannot dictate his own will to others. Avoidance of that point is also an extra price that will result in instability. In missile systems that are strengthening deterrence, this will be influential. If the system reaches stability all unnecessary action will lead to instability. Then, war ceases to be when all countries reach a balanced threat. At this moment stability is created. "It is exactly in this point that Waltz says that if your goal is order and end of the war the expansion of atomic weapons is good."

But the problem of this theory is that some countries do not accept any restriction and seek to impose their own will and replace the stability with instability. Thus, another form of competition emerges and in this competitive space, the units always seek after reconstruction of their systems. Here deterrence can be fragile and put security in danger. To overcome this fragility one needs to change the balance point every second and missile systems help us to reach a new balance point. This situation always exists and the system continuously reconstructs itself and this renewal and dynamicity of the system leads to the establishment of stability and strengthens deterrence.

Missile Systems and Their Place in Deterrence System in the Form of Quadruple Strategies of Deterrence:

The deterrence system is basically of four strategies of invasion, defense, confidence-building, and peace in the theoretical form (Qasemi, 2014: 99). David Garen Ham enumerates the quadruple methods of reaching deterrence as follows:

- 1- Deterrence via threatening the enemy to the adoption of tough punishments ;
- 2- Deterrence via intimidation; instilling the idea in the mind of the enemy that "you enjoy such a defense power that any invasion is doomed to be defeated."
- 3-Deterrence via renewal of confidence in the sense that it struggles to convince other countries that your intentions are not dangerous .
- 4- Deterrence via a mutual accord and giving concession to the enemy in return for the suspension of aggressive action (Farshchi, 2004: 33).

Deterrence is one of the systems of management of regional order which has been

noticed by the countries in the region. Before the emergence of MDW power balance was the most popular system but after the change of international systems that was followed by the emergence of MDW deterrence enjoyed a particular place and it was in some sense replaced with the power balance system.

Today numerous countries rely on missile arms as part of their national security strategies. Among 31 countries that have ballistic missiles, only 9 countries have nuclear capability (Erasto, 2017). Expansion of MDW, missile technology among the units of international order, including nuclear and non-nuclear units due to their capability of targeting enemy's facilities and also enjoying the mass destruction capability can throw impediments before deterrence or bring about numerous opportunities. In other words, as the variable causing instability in deterrence, it is also considered to be involved in changing the balance point. Meanwhile, the effort for the creation of a missile defense system as one of the most important themes discussed in the theory of deterrence imposes itself to the strategic studies and changes into one of the most influential factors in world order (Qasemi, 2011 A: 183). The function of missile systems and their influence on the conditions of regional stability and instability in West Asia (Middle East) should be evaluated in line with the influence of intervening powers and the reactions of the Regional powers.

Types of Deterrence

1-Mutual deterrence between the main parties to the target global order: making the determinate enemy vulnerable – neutralizing the first blow of the enemy and providing the ground for the second blow.

2-One-sided deterrence: its goal is the

protection of religious allies by the intervening element and neutralizing the enemy's attacks on the regional allies.

3-Triangular deterrence: its goal is making vulnerable the regional allies and making it impossible or neutralizing the attacks by the intervening party.

4-Network deterrence: its target is the total gamut of various regional networks and making impossible the missile attack capability of the others to oneself (Qasemi, 2011 A: 206) .

Missile Systems and Instability in Deterrence

The development of missile defense systems can lead to further deepening of the instability in the global system and would cause the actors to be led towards the strengthening of their military capability based on their knowledge of the instability (Hadian, Hormozi, 2011: 59).

The current state of the world shows that the ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, fluent, viable, trustable, and exact while the scope of their use is widening. Some countries are struggling to intensify their security measures against ballistic missiles and to reach the capability to attack them before their shooting and the effort for increasing their efficiency in missile defense (Rose, 2010: 2).

The US-Russia race for settlement of missile defense shield in various points of the world has had considerable effects on regional and international geopolitics. General Patrick J. O. Reilly the head of the American Missile Defense Agency says: in 1972 only 9 countries had access to ballistic missiles. Today 20 countries have ballistic missiles (Reilly, 2011: 1). The increasing number of countries having access to ballistic missiles is a sign of the

increase of threats in the world. In such an anarchic environment an arms race takes form. It is exactly in such an atmosphere that the country which is not armed loses the edge. The nation that chooses not to be armed becomes passive. It loses the bargaining chip. It will be unable to create regimes, i.e. principles, norms, rules, and procedures of decision making (Askarkhani, 1998: 48) .

Having distinguished between two types of aggressive power balance and instability versus corporative and managed power balance Waltz states that in a bipolar system we are witness to a corporative balance between two poles in the management of crises and establishment of balance. He notes that during Cold War Moscow and Washington officially recognized their domains of influence and insensitive domain they either triggered a war (e.g. Iran vs. Iraq War) or brought the wars to their end. On the other hand, despite fifty years of ideologic hostility, global race, and continuous crises no clash occurred between these two poles. According to Waltz, both types of power balance are the result of anarchy and both restrict state behavior (Rasuli Thani Abadi, 2009: 57). Kenneth Waltz considers the structure of the international system to be monopolar after the Cold War in which the United States of America is the undefeated power. Nevertheless, the monopolar system is the most unstable system that is associated always with efforts for reaching a balance with the hegemon power. Waltz has two reasons for demonstration of the instability of the monopolar system: firstly, hegemon government is interested in undertaking more responsibilities that will weaken it in long term; secondly, the governing principle in the international system is anarchy which itself causes other countries to be worried always of

the centralized power even if the hegemon behaves softly (Rezaei, 2008: 282). Instability in West Asia (Middle East) is one of the worst states for America because the interests of this country in the energy field are exposed to danger. On the other hand, in one state, instability can be in favor of the interests of this country in the sense that if the region becomes insecure the US can increase the number of its military in American bases in Math Middle East and Arab countries like Bahrain. Moreover, America annually receives a certain amount of money from Arab countries to ensure their security. It also has numerous military bases in the Gulf countries like Bahrain and an agreement has been reached to install ballistic missiles in Turkey. On the other hand, many Middle East countries buy their required military products and facilities from the US and for this reason, they feel a lot of dependencies on the US. By the increase of the sense of insecurity the amount of intervention of trans-regional power can be increased (Mohseni and Salehi, 2011: 615). The extent of freedom of the hegemon and the type of intervening behavior and a kind of sense of responsibility in an anarchic system cause many security equations to be blurred including the defense-invasion equation.

Change in defense-invasion balance has a considerable effect on the emergence of war and chaos in the international system. Those factors that facilitate aggressive operations or reduce the costs of such operations as compared to defensive operations increase the probability of war and crisis. Generally speaking, the anarchic and self-assisted nature of the international system causes the governments not to trust just the intentions of their potential rivals. They infer much of their intentions from the capabilities. When aggression is superior behaviors will turn

aggressive either. When defense prevails the governments are less worried about the intentions of their rivals. Then, conflicts resulted from fear will be less (Qasemi, 2011 B: 118).

Although installment of missile defense shield is always done under the pretext of defense against the possible attacks and creation of deterrence the target countries do not have such a defensive notion. In other words, they see the settlement and strengthening of such a system as a sign of "invasion". Since one's notion of reality can be more effective than the reality itself, then the sense of the existence of missile defense that besides its defensive role can function as an "invasive shield" is a factor that strengthens and proliferates arms (Hadian, Hormozi, 2011: 60).

Missile Systems and Strategic Stability in Deterrence System

Strategic stability is a fundamental notion in conflicting games. Any strategic instability could cause international conflicts. The equation of strategic stability explains the interrelation between power and threat among the actors involved in this issue. This interrelation can be defined based on the defense-invasion equation. Strategic stability can be regarded as a situation in which the units reach a balance in the scale of threat against each other and therefore they lose the ability to take inappropriate action against each other (Qasemi, 2016: 80). The deterrence pattern based on missile systems that leads to strategic stability follows a specific logic that takes form according to the calculation of cost and benefits around rationality.

The logic governing the current deterrence pattern is indeed an expression of the rationality governing the behavioral actions of the actors in this scene. Dominant deterrence

logic is based on three interrelated arguments concerning ordinary disputes :

1-Basically the governments that think of a normal invasion to other states seek after an immediate and cheap victory and avoid destructive war.

2- Ordinary deterrence in the first step is based on deterrence through denial, i.e. the capability of prevention of enemy from reaching his own goals through war.

3- Credit means real threat and the rival's belief that the counterpart enjoys such a capability. In other words, the rationality of threat is the condition of validity of threat (Qasemi, 2009: 59-60). If deterrence strategy is supposed to be effective one needs to penetrate the expectations of the other party to the extent that it believes that the deterrent threat will be implemented. It should believe that it takes any hostile action it will be immediately retaliated. Of course, there are numerous difficulties here. Some threats are essentially valid while others need to be validated (Research Center of Islamic Parliament, 1996: 6). Missile systems are among the strategic tools of deterrence and from the very outset these two act as complementary. In deterrence, the capability of threat is intertwined with the implementation of threat (Qasemi, 2011 A: 207). Colin Gary contends that the lack of arm and complete elimination of existing arms do not guarantee peace rather the existence of these arms and equality of military and arm capability of countries will cause the stability of the existing situation and prevent the emergence of war and disorder (Saed quoted from Colin Gary, 2010: 105).

Moreover, political factors also influence the lack of attention to the capabilities of the countries in regional instability. Accordingly, it is wrong to think that in the Middle East such countries as Isreal and Saudi Arabia can be

equipped with ballistic missiles but Iran does not have the right to do so (Erasto, 2017).

Missile Systems of Intervening Power and Regional Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Multilayered defensive systems are interrelated in the form of a defensive chain and are in line with strategic defensive goals for controlling and planning global and regional challenging powers. Other governments also make numerous efforts to keep the balance in order not be perished under the sway of this circle

Thus, the combination of these three fundamental factors or measures of effectiveness – larger defended area per site, higher Pick, and battlespace sufficient to permit an S-A-S firing doctrine – combine to provide a %75 reduction in the number of missiles that are required in the defense laydown.

According to the strategic documents published in 2010 that show the US after the collapse of the USSR considers itself the unrivaled power. This country seeks to prevail over the strategic regions in the world through exact planning and military actions .

For regional missile defense, the US missile defense agency has developed a battleground with middle-range base capabilities along with sea and land stations for confrontation with low-range ballistic missiles (1000 Kilometers). The capabilities of low-range missile defense in 2011 include PAC3, THAAD, and ballistic missile defense shield (Reilly, 2011: 4) .

In line with this policy, the Middle East (West Asia) is one of the main geographical regions that has been defined as a serious threat to America's national interests that includes two subsystems of the Persian Gulf and East Mediterranean. In this region, the only power

that deterrence policy should be adopted in dealing with it is Islamic Republic (Jamshidi, 2012: 135) .

The United States claims that some actions and behaviors of the Islamic Republic put the stability and security of the region in danger and sets Iran at the level of the countries supporting terrorism. Thus, trusting it and cooperating with it is against the US strategies. Iranians also consider many of the behaviors and policies of the US to conflict with their sense of independence and national and international rights of Iran. They also believe that the United States treats Iran's peaceful activities with hostility (Takhshid, Alavi, 2016: 84). Upon the entrance of MDW the power of hegemon and exact planning based on the geographical and geopolitical structure of every region and stage y state comparison for controlling non-submissive countries that are not in line with global policies and the hegemon power has naturally caused the security of other countries to be in danger and for this reason, they are showing reaction and try to near themselves to an acceptable military place depending on the geographical and military situation and to this end, they are making countless efforts to reach a balance point via stabilizing and optimization. Today the issue of missile defense shield that has its origin in IRI's military capability and its deterrence power in the international system is discussed in many political and military circles and research in this area is of utmost significance .

Regional Security of Islamic Republic of Iran

The regional security of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the necessity of).

preservation of its existence after the 1979 Revolution is originated in the change of the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moreover, with the change of international system and the formation of the hegemonic system due to the US having the lead in the system the implementation of structural restrictions on this country has been intensified (Qasemi, 2011 B: 427). Pushing the danger back and liberation from threat is the option that a revolutionary country like Iran refers to justify its access to missile facilities and strategic defense system. Thus, the transformation of the internal environment and systemic environment of Iran leads to the emergence of regional and systematic threats against this country, then a certain set of variables encourages Iran to be resolute in its belief that deterrence is the only strategic solution to this situation (Qasemi, 2011B: 427) .

Generally speaking, a regional deterrence system particularly by uneasy countries in the region is designed in response to a controlling system of intervening power. In other words, the most important threat which is considered to be strategic by these countries and is designed for resisting this deterrence system is the threats resulting from the presence of the intervening regional power and its strategic actions (Qasemi, Keshavarz Shokri, 2009: 174). And in this relationship, the fortification of deterrence defensive tools is one of the most important goals of Iranian defensive strategy which is evolving from the point of view of many military experts.

It seems that Iran's ballistic missiles will continuously grow because missile technology is evolving along with the skills of design and construction (Cordesman et al 2014: 138




Figure 8: Military Spending, Modernization, and the Shifting Military Balance in the Gulf
Source: Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas Harrington Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Working Draft September 4, 2018

The growth and development of Iran's ballistic missile program is not a global threat rather it is part of the dynamicity of the wider regional security and cannot be considered in seclusion. In the same way that missiles play a key role in the strategy of Iran's national security, it is unrealistic to expect Iran to avoid the effort for improvement of its function and its capability for existence via missile tests (Erasto, 2017) . The growth and development of Iran's ballistic missile program is not a global threat rather it is part of the dynamicity of the wider regional security and cannot be considered in seclusion. In the same way that missiles play a key role in the strategy of Iran's national security, it is unrealistic to expect Iran to avoid the effort for improvement of its function and its capability for existence via missile tests (Erasto, 2017) .

Systematic Order in Regional Deterrence and Security Dilemma in West Asia

Systematic order will be sustained when the leaders recognize that their potential

opponents in the event of an undesirable behavior will have the capability and will for retaliation. Therefore, in response to the potential invasion, the strategists should come up with solutions to enhance military capability that would show enough will to retaliate and in this way strengthen the deterrence threats (Qasemi, 2009: 59).

Interventionist powers are the ring linking the global order to regional orders. Meanwhile, the intervening powers are involved in various ways in the formation and intensification of the regional security dilemma and regional strategic instability and arms race:

- 1- Building military bases in the region and intensification of regional security dilemma ;
- 2 -Military interventionism in the region ;
- 3-Formation of regional unions and coalitions and the externalism resulted from it ;
- 4- Creation of regional dependent states for implementation of the desirable regional order ;

5- Formation of bilateral and multilateral regional treaties (Qasemi, Pur Jam, 2013: 153) .

But the point that should be heeded in the contemporary era is that among all presidents of the United States of America who relatively enjoyed a consistent political system, Trump has adopted inconsistent, unrealistic, and dangerous stances and policies at internal and foreign levels. This can have extensive consequences in both levels and as a result in the international system (Yazdan Fam, 2016: 159). American authorities naturally behave in a way as if a monopolar system is governing the world. They are boasting of American power and virtue. They introduce the United States as a hegemon of goodwill and lecture other countries on the universal validity of American principles, behavior, and institutions. The President of the United States in the G7 summit in 1997 in Denver proudly described America's economic successes as a pattern for others. Madeleine Albright the US Secretary of State described America as an undeniable country and stated: we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us. This is all right and it suggests that the US is part of the solution to the global problems. However, it is wrong in that it implicitly considers other countries' deniability while presenting the US as the undeniable source of intelligence. The United States has no way but cooperation with other key countries across the globe to address the existing problems (Huntington, 1999: 84). Trump's vision and approach to the world conflict with the longstanding principles of American foreign policy and it is in practice a threat to international order and security (Yazdanfam, 2016: 154).

Now despite the existence of intervening power (the US) in the region and the necessity of military capabilities of the allies and the lack of convergence between the regional units naturally every country will be involved in the arms race to sustain its security. This is also vital for the country that is among the revolutionary countries that are against American policies. Iran's attention to strategic weapons dates back to the time when Iranian cities were bombarded by Iraqi missiles .

The role of ballistic missiles in Iran's national security was highlighted in the 1980s when its cities were defenseless before the Scud missiles of Saddam. Iran's access to short-range missiles was a turning point in Iran vs. Iraq war. Since then the importance of ballistic missiles was noticed more by Iran (Erasto, 2017). On the other hand, the protection of Isreal is one of the most vital interests and a major concern of the US. To this end, the development of Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities and potency that can target Isreal has always been worrisome for American leaders. Accordingly, numerous and extensive efforts have been made to prevent Iran from reaching nuclear weapons. The United States always seeks to stop the development of Iranian ballistic missiles and their launching systems because American politicians believe that these capabilities are designed for launching nuclear warfare.

Of course one needs to take into account that Trump Administration has caused an extensive gap in the national and international arena. If the Islamic Republic does not take any concrete step for intensification of this gap it should not at least make it less colorful. Prevention from the formation of consensus inside the US and region and world is one of the main goals of the foreign policy of the

Islamic Republic of Iran (Yazdan Fam, 2016: 161). On the other hand, following the expansion of disputes regarding Iran's nuclear file and the ascending process of Iranophobia in the region one of the issues was the creation of a missile defense system in Arab countries. One of America's continuous strategies has been the creation of an artificial threat of Iran to expand its military presence in the Persian Gulf region. Then, this idea is continuously promoted that in the event of lack of an "American led security system" in the Persian Gulf Iran will implement its diabolic intentions. In the light of this Iranophobia, the required legitimacy for the preservation of American military bases in Arab countries was ensured, and also the trade of military arms and facilities is growing (Tabyyin Think Tank, 2015: 3). Obama Administration reached the most important international nuclear deal with Iran along with leveling the toughest bilateral and multilateral international sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Trump describes this as the worst deal ever reached. He considers Iran as the most important supporter of terrorism who seeks to destabilize the region and harm American interests and its regional allies (Yazdan Fam, 2016: 157). Thus, Trump decided to leave JCPOA. After US withdrawal the regional instability was intensified. America under Trump is more interested in profit-seeking instead of regional stability. To this end, it struggles to destabilize the region to reach its goals.

Thus, America struggles to increase the rate of sale of arms to regional countries to implement its goals (Kardan, 2010: 10). The report of Siperi Peace Institute suggests that the growth of the sale of arms in the Middle East has been unprecedented in the last five years since the Cold War era. According to this report, the

import of arms by countries in the Middle East region in 2012-2016 as compared to 2007-2011 shows an 87 percent growth. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been the largest importers of arms. According to the same report, Saudi Arabia has been the second importer of military arms in the world during 2012-2016 and shows 212 percent growth as compared to the previous era in 2007-2011. Only in 2015, Saudi Arabia has purchased 9.300 000 000 dollars in arms for invading Yemen and arming the terrorists in Iraq and Syria and this number shows a 50 percent growth as compared to the previous year. 800 million dollars have been spent on buying F 35 as well as various types of missiles air to air, air to land, and surface to surface (Dorj, Aqaei, 2017: 60).

America seeks to reach the following goals via its outdated policies of Iranophobia and with selling modern arms in west Asia and settlement of missile systems:

- 1- Protection of its immediate and vital interests, i.e. Zionist regime.
- 2- the Marginalizing Islamic Republic of Iran as a disharmonious and dissonant country.
- 3- Supporting Arab allies in the region and arming their geographic space through missile systems that are in line with the Israeli missile systems and complement the global missile system and guarantee American security which is implemented stage by stage.
- 4-Preservation of proper arm market in West Asia and selling numerous modern weapons and warfare to the regional countries.
- 5- Mobilizing the allies and supporting them in their confrontation with Iran's possible missile threats (in line with the project of Iranophobia).

6- Domination over the regional sources and physical presence near the strategic regions.

Overall, this type of behavior, i.e. the effort of the regional governments for changing power balance has involved West Asia (as a big arm market) in an intensified arms race. The US accuses Iran and many other countries in the region of expansion of MDW and supporting terrorists and based on the preemptive war theories that have been developed by American scholars particularly after 9/11. Then it continuously attacks these countries. Then, these countries are naturally worried about the intentions of the US government and they hope that at least for defending themselves they will reach a relative capability of threatening the interests of the West and the US.

Perhaps the development of short-range missiles of Iranian marine forces can be justified accordingly. Many of this type of Cruise Missiles can target warships, oil tankers, shore fortifications alongside the Persian Gulf, and other similar targets (Qavam Maleki quoted from Kordzman, 2011: 113).

On the other hand, the regional deterrence system, particularly by regional dissatisfied countries, is designed in response to the control system of the intervening power. In other words, the most important threat which is considered to be strategic on the behalf of these countries and design their deterrence system based on it is the threats resulting from the presence of intervening power in the region and its strategic actions (Qasemi, 2009: 69).

The arrival of missile defense systems also intensifies the instability. When the US struggles to protect and immunize itself against artificial threats whose reality has not been demonstrated it causes more instability and

pressure in the system. More ambiguity encourages the countries for seeking more facilities. The basic problem lies in the possible interpretations and misinterpretations. Thus, the US will install its missile defense system in the region (Hadian, Hormozi, 2011: 60).

Conclusion

The results of the present study show that one of the effective tools in the field of stabilization and deterrence is missile systems. As the development of Iran's missile systems leads, the United States and the occupying regime in Jerusalem are more cautious about the region and given the numerous security threats in the West Asian region from neighbors, the occupying regime in Jerusalem and the West, especially the states. The United States, and given the air superiority of the occupying regimes in Jerusalem and the West, missiles can play an effective deterrent role for countries in the region. But non-war is when countries reach a balanced threat, so in an anarchic international and regional climate, deterring Iran because of the characteristics of its defense strategy in the region provides greater security for Iran. Based on the rational model of balance of power in this study, Iran sought a strategy based on a new defense and tactical arrangement in the region to create deterrence and increase its security factor and counter US missile policies in the region. By increasing and expanding its power and scope against imported missile weapons, Iran will coordinate its efforts to open a new defense front with the ability to repel missile strikes while placing military intervention bases on the margins of Iran and its allies in the region. Shocks as an effective deterrent have become a positive deterrent, a positive point, and a new phenomenon in changing regional equations

and reaching the equilibrium point of power. In general, Iran's missile strategy is the result of strategic decisions of the holy defense era due to the enemy's air and missile superiority and lack of missile power and the exhaustion of Iran's air force and the reaction of the Islamic Republic of Iran to aggressors and international pressures means strategic instability in the region. West Asia and the formation of a model of conflict-based relations between the United States as an interventionist power and the Islamic Republic of Iran as a regional power provide the basis for aggressive interventionist strategies in the region. To prevent and overthrow the Islamic Republic. Iran has also chosen a strategic approach and the use of missile defense systems to maintain its security as the ultimate goal and the establishment of military bases and missile defense systems in the environment around Iran, which contributes to strategic instability. Based on the rational model of power balance in this study, Iran sought a strategy based on a new defensive arrangement and tactical territorial arrangement in the region to create deterrence and increase its security factor and counter US missile policies in the region. By increasing and expanding its power and scope against imported missile weapons, Iran will coordinate efforts to open a new defensive front capable of repelling missile strikes while placing military bases of intervening power in the periphery of Iran and its allies in the area. Shocks have become a positive inhibitor, a positive point, and a new phenomenon in changing regional equations and reaching the equilibrium point of power as an effective inhibitor. Overall, Iran's missile strategy was the result of strategic decisions during the Holy Defense due to the enemy's air and missile superiority and lack of missile power and the

exhaustion of Iran's air force, and the reaction of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the invaders and the pressures of the international structure. This means that strategic instability in the West Asian region and the formation of a model of hostile relations between the United States as an intervening power and the Islamic Republic of Iran as a regional power, pave the way for aggressive interventionist strategies in the region to block and overthrow the Islamic Republic. As the ultimate goal and the establishment of military bases and the deployment of missile defense systems in the environment around Iran, which contributes to strategic instability, Iran has also chosen a strategic approach and the use of missile defense systems to maintain its security.

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